1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	TOWN OF OYSTER BAY,
5	Appellant,
6	-against-
7	Nos. 214 to 223 LIZZA INDUSTRIES, INC., (and nine other actions)
8	Respondent.
9	20 Fig. 1. Character
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207 November 12, 2013
11	Before:
12	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
16	ASSOCIATE GODGE SHETEA ADDOS SALAARI
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1	Appearances:
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23	
24	Karen Schiffmiller

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Town of Oyster Bay v. 1 2 Lizza. 3 Counsel, do you want any rebuttal time? 4 MR. INGHAM: Two minutes, please, Your 5 Honor. 6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes - - -7 MR. INGHAM: Two minutes. 8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Sure, go ahead. 9 MR. INGHAM: May it please the court, my 10 name is Mike Ingham. I represent all of the local 11 municipal plaintiffs in this case. 12 I think this case breaks down to a very 13 simple question for this court. Presented to this 14 court are two very distinct lines of cases, one going 15 back to at least 1942 in Coley v. Cohen, where this 16 court recognized and applauded local cities and 17 counties for protecting their inhabitants by 18 inserting a no fault, hold harmless clause in their 19 sewer contracts, which protected their inhabitants 20 and local utilities and sidewalks - - - village 21 sidewalks - - - from damage that inevitably occurs 22 when massive sewer projects are installed. 2.3 That line of cases, established basically 2.4 by this court in Coley v. Cohen in 1942, was not

novel even in 1942, stated by this court - - -

1 JUDGE SMITH: Are you - - - are you - - -2 I'm not sure how that ties in with this case. Are 3 you saying that that contractual provision is 4 necessary to your lawsuit against these defendants? 5 MR. INGHAM: No, it's not. But what I'm 6 attempting to say is that that Coley v. Cohen case 7 was approved by the Fourth Department in 1960 when 8 the Rochester sewers went in; they cited Coley v. 9 It was affirmed again when Amherst put their 10 sewers in and the Fourth Department handed down the 11 Secord case stating that these clauses were 12 independent of the negligence cause of action. 13 were adopted again in the Second Department - - -14 JUDGE SMITH: I'm - - - I'm still puzzled 15 about what this has to do with the case you're 16 arguing today. 17 MR. INGHAM: Because I think I - - -18 JUDGE GRAFFEO: I thought we - - - I 19 thought we had a statute of limitations issue as to 2.0 whether - - -21 MR. INGHAM: Well, I think what you've got 22 is a situation where these - - - these clauses are no 2.3 fault, hold harmless clauses. They are a totally 2.4 separate contract cause of action.

JUDGE GRAFFEO: Can I ask you a question?

1	Are these contracts in the record? Or is there just
2	
3	MR. INGHAM: Oh, yes.
4	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Or is there just no
5	dispute?
6	MR. INGHAM: Oh, yes, there's contracts
7	from the record. Yeah, they're in the briefs too.
8	The contracts are in the record. There's a specific
9	clause in the Suffolk County contract
10	JUDGE GRAFFEO: I mean, I know the clause
11	that's in both of your briefs.
12	MR. INGHAM: I
13	JUDGE GRAFFEO: But the actual text of the
14	contracts, do you have them?
15	MR. INGHAM: I firmly believe those clauses
16	are in the contract are in the record on
17	appeal. The record on appeal
18	JUDGE SMITH: I I saw an affidavit
19	that quoted the main clause. I didn't I wasn't
20	able to find the contracts themselves. I had the
21	same problem as Judge Graffeo.
22	MR. INGHAM: I don't believe there's an
23	issue of fact as to whether these contracts include a
24	hold harmless clause. And these clauses
25	JUDGE PIGOTT: So that gives you the right

to sue the town, right?

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MR. INGHAM: I have a right to sue the town on four separate causes of action, and that's where these clauses come into play. The Suffolk County Water Authority v. J.D. Posillico case and the Town of Babylon v. Lizza case affirm this line of cases, which say I have a cause of action in negligence - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Where's the continuing tort? Assuming you have, where - - - where is the continuing tort here?

MR. INGHAM: The continuing tort arises out of the Second Department citation to this court's decision in Village of Haverstraw, wherein there is an erosion of subjacent support in the streets because there was improper backfill, and that erosion of lateral support causes a defect in the overlying street, and there's - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So where's the defendant's continuing responsibility? What do they have to do?

MR. INGHAM: I believe that ties directly into this court's decision in Bloomingdales. In Bloomingdales, especially once you take a hard look at the Fourth - - - First Department decision, there

1	are two separate issues of injury or damage that are
2	set forth in Bloomingdales. One is the negligence
3	cause of action, which is damage to the pipe. In the
4	Cranesville Block, there was a severing of the
5	of the railroad track easement.
6	Here, in our cases, we understand that
7	there was some damage it could have been
8	property damage
9	JUDGE SMITH: But but as I understand
LO	Bloomingdales isn't it clear from our opinion
L1	in Bloomingdales that if all you had was the severing
L2	of the pipe, the statute would have run?
L3	MR. INGHAM: And that's precisely correct,
L4	and precisely the other alternative section in
L5	Bloomingdales was that if you interfere with easement
16	rights
	JUDGE SMITH: Isn't it isn't it
L7	
L7 L8	JUDGE SMITH: Isn't it isn't it
L7 L8 L9	JUDGE SMITH: Isn't it isn't it JUDGE RIVERA: Okay, so what are your
L6 L7 L8 L9 L9 L20 L21 L9 L9 L9 L9 L9 L9 L9 L	JUDGE SMITH: Isn't it isn't it JUDGE RIVERA: Okay, so what are your easement rights?
L7 L8 L9	JUDGE SMITH: Isn't it isn't it JUDGE RIVERA: Okay, so what are your easement rights? MR. INGHAM: It's an interference with the
L7 L8 L9 20	JUDGE SMITH: Isn't it isn't it JUDGE RIVERA: Okay, so what are your easement rights? MR. INGHAM: It's an interference with the easement. So it's

two independent lines of law. The first is the

1	Haverstraw case. And the Haverstraw case which was
2	reaffirmed by this court in Kim, fairly recently,
3	indicates that anyone who digs in or near a public
4	highway has a common law obligation to make sure that
5	they restore the road to its usual condition, and
6	make sure the line and the grade is in place.
7	JUDGE SMITH: Okay, but if that obligation
8	was breached, it was breached a long time ago. How
9	come the statute hasn't run out?
10	MR. INGHAM: Because that breach interfered
11	with the overlying street easement owned by the local
12	towns and villages.
13	JUDGE PIGOTT: On an ongoing basis? On an
14	ongoing
15	MR. INGHAM: There's a statutory basis as
16	well. The statutory basis
17	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Even if for ten or fifteen
18	years there was no problem?
19	MR. INGHAM: Absolutely. Under the county
20	under county
21	JUDGE GRAFFEO: If it's twenty years later?
22	MR. INGHAM: Under County Law 263, anybody
23	who when the county goes in and puts their
24	sewers in, they must restore the contractor and

the county - - - must restore their road to its usual

1	condition. The failure to do so the same as
2	severing the pipe has called a continued
3	interference with that easement. We have we
4	cannot snowplow our roads. We cannot drive on these
5	roads.
6	JUDGE RIVERA: So if they fixed it
7	I'm sorry. If they did the work, there's damage,
8	they went back and fixed it, but they didn't fix it
9	very well and twenty years later you had the damage
10	again. Are you saying that at that point
11	MR. INGHAM: Well, what the no, what
12	the count
13	JUDGE RIVERA: they still have a
14	liability?
15	MR. INGHAM: What the county did was
16	install sewers in in the streets. In doing so
17	the contractor failed to compact the backfill.
18	JUDGE PIGOTT: Why didn't you sue them
19	then?
20	MR. INGHAM: Because I can't sue until the
21	common law substance gives me a cause of action to
22	find substance on the street surface.
23	JUDGE PIGOTT: Did you know that there was
24	that there was bad fill?
25	MR. INGHAM: Even if I did know there was

1 bad fill, I can't sue until there's surface 2 substance. In the law in the State of New York, in 3 common law substance - - -4 JUDGE PIGOTT: As I understand it, you're a 5 third party beneficiary of the contract between the 6 county, whatever - - -7 MR. INGHAM: I am. 8 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - and the contractor. 9 All right? If it's not done right, you can go to the 10 county and say, it's not done right; fix it. And if 11 they don't, you can sue them and say, fix it. 12 MR. INGHAM: I would say that I think that 13 really looks to - - - I think - - - let me see if I 14 can articulate that that third party beneficiary 15 cause of action clearly. It's a very limited claim. 16 It only takes place during the execution of the work 17 itself, primarily when there's excavation and 18 backfilling, where you have damage to the local 19 utilities or streets or sidewalks or - - - or 20 driveways. That cause of action can only accrue at 21 the time the activity is going on, the excavation 22 activity. 2.3 JUDGE SMITH: So that - - - so that one 2.4 must be time barred, because it accrued - - -

MR. INGHAM: Absolutely; so is the

negligence. And just - - - just as you have - just 1 2 as you - - - just as you've gone in the cause - - -3 in Bloomingdales and Cranesville Block - - -4 JUDGE SMITH: So what you're saying is you 5 have a lot of different causes of action, and one of them is not time barred. 6 7 MR. INGHAM: That is correct. Only one. 8 And that - - -9 JUDGE SMITH: And that one is the 10 continuing nuisance - - -11 MR. INGHAM: That is the continuing wrong 12 doctrine of continuing nuisance, continuing - - -13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But isn't this different than Bloomingdales? This is exactly - - -14 15 in your mind, this is analogous to Bloomingdales? 16 MR. INGHAM: Well, I think to better look 17 at it is to take a hard look at the First Department 18 decision - - -19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I know about the 20 First Department decision - - -21 MR. INGHAM: In the First - - - and the 22 First Department decision relies on a case which I 2.3 think is directly on point. In Cranesville Block, 2.4 the railroad company had a street easement or a road

easement over the top of the road, on top of the

1 land. The contracting company came in, destroyed the 2 overlying railroad tracks. That cause of action was 3 in negligence only. It expired three years after 4 injury and fact, and the railroad couldn't sue for 5 that injury. 6 What Cranesville Block and what the First 7 Department did in Bloomingdales was say you have a 8 distinct cause of action and a possessory right to 9 the easement. And if you - - -10 JUDGE SMITH: But in Bloomingdales and Cranesville, wasn't it based on an encroachment? 11 12 There was a conduit in Bloomingdales. I forget what 13 it was. There was something to make - - -MR. INGHAM: 14 There was also a gas main 15 installed in Cranesville Block. 16 JUDGE SMITH: So where's your con - - -17 what's your conduit? What's your gas main? 18 MR. INGHAM: Mine is the fact that they 19 failed to install and recompact the sewer trench to 20 the same extent that they impaired the easement to my 21 sewage - - -22 JUDGE SMITH: Isn't failing to do something 2.3 different from encroaching on your property? 2.4 MR. INGHAM: No, I disagree with that,

because the failure in Cranesville Block to install

1 the gas pipe in the proper way, so it would not 2 interfere with the overlying easement, is the direct 3 analogy to the failure to install that sewer pipe in 4 the correct way, and it continued - - - and the 5 failure to do so continually interfered with my overlying easement in my streets. It's a continuing 6 7 wrong; it's a continuing nuisance. 8 The Second Department in the Suffolk County 9 Water Authority case specifically held and sustained 10 a continuing nuisance public cause of action, based 11 on Haverstraw. You have Haverstraw; you've got Kim. 12 You've a legal obligation to restore the line and 13 grade. If you don't restore the line and grade, you've interfered with the easement rights of the 14 15 village and the town. 16 JUDGE PIGOTT: But you were able to use it 17 for years. 18 MR. INGHAM: No, not true. 19 JUDGE PIGOTT: The day - - - the day that the - - - the - - -20 21 MR. INGHAM: It took years for that soil to 22 subside - - -2.3 JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. What did you do in

MR. INGHAM: We had the use of the

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those years?

overlying easement at that point, and that - - - and that was there. But at this stage of the game, once that's subsided, I've got manholes sticking up out of the ground and I've got broken curb and gutter, and I can't plow my streets. And I've had men who've gone through the windshields on their snowplows. They still today can't plow those streets. They mark them with a stick, and they lift their plows and you have improper snowplowing.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. Okay.

MR. INGHAM: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, counsel.

MR. INGHAM: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You'll have rebuttal.

Counsel?

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MR. DENBY: May it please the court, my name is John Denby. I'm appearing for the defendants, Hendrickson Brothers and Lizza Industries. With the court's permission, I would like to address the issues of statute of limitations and accrual pertaining to breach of contract. And my colleague, Jared Greisman, will address issues pertaining to accrual of statute of limitations with respect to tort, continuing nuisance, and the public policies issues - - -

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead, counsel.
2	MR. DENBY: presented by this case.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So you deal with the
4	breach of contract.
5	MR. DENBY: A breach of contract is never
6	considered a tort unless it involves a legal duty
7	that is separate from the contract. The duty to
8	install sewers in this case and to restore the
9	roadway to its pre-construction condition was a duty
10	that was subsumed within the contract and was a
11	material part of the contract.
12	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, are are the
13	- are the towns an owner or are they a third party
14	beneficiary?
15	MR. DENBY: They're they've been
16	adjudicated to be a third party beneficiary. My
17	adversary
18	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Does that make a
19	difference?
20	MR. DENBY: It makes no difference,
21	whatsoever. There's no no, there's no
22	difference at all. The status as a third party
23	beneficiary gives them the same rights as any other
24	signatory to the contract.

JUDGE SMITH: Are they sue - - - are they

suing under the contract?

MR. DENBY: Are they sue - - - it's - -
it is my position that they are. If you look at

that the defendants committed defective construction under the contract by failing to properly excavate

7 | the backfill the - - -

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JUDGE SMITH: But as I understand it, the only rights they have under the contract are, that you got to leave their equipment alone, or if you damage it, you've got to fix it. That's - - - that's not what they're suing for.

their complaint, paragraph 6 of the complaint says

MR. DENBY: They're suing for repairs - - - millions of dollars - - - for repairs to the roadways. Those are contract damages. They're not suing to abate a nuisance. They're not - - -

JUDGE SMITH: Well, where - - - where in the contract does it say that you've got to give subjacent support to their roadways?

MR. DENBY: The - - - the con - - - the contracts - - - the - - - as conceded by my adversary, County Law Section 263 requires the contractors to restore the roadways to the preconstruction condition. And that - - - that would be that they would have to provide adequate support for

1 the roadways, otherwise the roadways subside. 2 JUDGE GRAFFEO: So if this damage had 3 occurred within six years, would they have a valid 4 claim? 5 MR. DENBY: Absolutely. And they sued - -- six years is after substantial completion. And if 6 7 you look at the cases that are cited in the - - - in 8 the briefs, particularly the Bethpage case, where my 9 adversary sued on behalf of Bethpage Water District, 10 he sued as a third party beneficiary for defective 11 construction and he prevailed. 12 JUDGE SMITH: And following Judge Graffeo's 13 question, what is the - - - what is the language in 14 the contract that would have given them a right to 15 sue if they'd come in within the six years? 16 MR. DENBY: The - - - the county - - -17 County Law Section 263 - - -18 JUDGE SMITH: It's not in the contract? 19 MR. DENBY: This - - - well, my - - - as my20 adversary concedes, stipulates and agrees, and writes 21 in his brief at page 10 to 12, this County Law 22 Section was written in to the contract. So the 2.3 County Law Section says that the roadways - - - the 2.4 highways - - - have to be restored to their original

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condition.

1 JUDGE SMITH: Do we - - - do we have 2 anywhere before us contract's text that says that? 3 MR. DENBY: We do not have the contracts in the record. These - - - as my adversary just 4 5 conceded in oral argument, it does not present a question of fact. He has stipulated and agreed that 6 7 8 JUDGE SMITH: Okay, so he stipulated as to 9 what they say? What do they say? What are the 10 words? 11 MR. DENBY: Well, the words in County Law 12 263 is exactly what I just said, that they have to be 13 restored to their pre-construction condition. 14 JUDGE GRAFFEO: So the statutory language 15 was made a provision of the contract? 16 MR. DENBY: That's exactly what my 17 adversary said. 18 JUDGE GRAFFEO: The statutory language and 19 that's what you folks have stipulated? 20 MR. DENBY: Yes, well, that's what's said at my - - - in my adversary's brief from 10 to 12 of 21 22 the brief, it says that this is in the contract. 2.3 It's a material part of the contract, and that's what 2.4 he's suing on. Look at the complaint.

JUDGE PIGOTT: If I'm not bifurcating

1 properly here, but if it's a con - - - if you're 2 supposed to have done that and you did not, isn't it 3 a continuing problem, a continuing wrong? 4 MR. DENBY: Well, I - - - my adversary will 5 deal with that in much greater detail. 6 JUDGE PIGOTT: I thought that's what - - -7 MR. DENBY: But - - - but a - - - in many 8 cases you have a - - - an incident - - - a wrongful 9 incident that creates continuing damages. That's not 10 a continuing tort. 11 JUDGE PIGOTT: No, what I was thinking of 12 is so often in these construction contracts, you 13 agree to do X, Y, and Z, and the last thing is - - -14 is backfill. And they get underbid sometimes because 15 the contractor's got all of his money upfront, and 16 the last thing he's got to do is this, so in order to 17 win the bid in the first instance, if they underbid 18 on the backfill, they may get the contract. 19 they're going to walk away, and the only remedy the 20 county's got is to - - - is to hire somebody to do it 21 and sue you for the damages, not you personally. 22 MR. DENBY: Right, that's - - - that's - -2.3 2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: All right? But the third

party beneficiaries, they got a pretty road. They've

got nice sidewalks. They got the grass back, and they don't know that underneath this where there should have been select fill, is nothing but rocks and sand. And so ten years later, when - - - when the sidewalk sinks, they're saying what in the world happened?

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And what happened was that ten years ago, you did not honor your con - - - not you personally, but the contractor, I'm figuring out - - - did not honor his contract, did not do what 263 required, and it's a continuing wrong up until the time that it's discovered by the third party beneficiary.

MR. DENBY: It's not a - - - it's not a continuing wrong. You're correct, that 263 requires them to do it. What you're articulating just now is a pure breach of contract. And in this case, when you say that they didn't know what happened, at page 389 of the record, they acknowledge that these defects arose in 1985, one year after they're alleging substantial completion.

In the Bethpage Water District case, he's - he's acknowledging in 1988 that these defects
occurred and they occurred because of improper
jetting, which is the theory that he has - - - that
he has raised in every single case throughout this

sewer construction case, saying that that's what's 1 2 called the subsidence. 3 So they knew about it in 1985. They knew 4 about it in 1988. It's - - - you cannot say that 5 they didn't know about it. This is a pure breach of 6 contract case. And since I - - - it accrued upon 7 substantial completion of the contract which is 8 alleged to be 1984 in the complaint, it is time 9 barred. 10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 11 MR. DENBY: Thank you very much. 12 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, counsel. 13 Counsel? MR. GREISMAN: Good afternoon. May it 14 15 please the court, my name is Jared Greisman and I 16 represent the balance of the contractors - - -17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, when you 18 talk about ongoing tort, is this case distinguishable 19 from Bloomingdales? 2.0 MR. GREISMAN: Absolutely. 21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Tell us why. 22 In Bloomingdales, you - - -MR. GREISMAN: 2.3 in Bloomingdales you had an ongoing encroachment by a 2.4 particular object that was interfering with 25 Bloomingdales' easement, their right to have ongoing

flow from the drainage pipe. Similar to 509 Sixth Avenue, where there was an encroachment by a particular object that had been constructed and placed in a - - - in a - - - it was essentially a trespass. It was placed in someplace that the plaintiffs had a right to.

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And in our case?

MR. GREISMAN: In our case, you have

consensual work that was preformed on the - - - under

the roadways. And what the claim is, in its very

essence, is defective construction. It's about a

particular act. It's about an allegation that there

was shoddy backfilling.

JUDGE GRAFFEO: Did these towns have inspectors there, or was this entirely a county project?

MR. GREISMAN: Outside of the record, I would be able to tell you that they had inspectors there, but the towns are - - are integral to the contracts. The contracts cannot be entered into without the town's permission. The towns are responsible for the roadways as the plaintiff pleads expressly in his - - in his complaint: who was it that has performed any maintenance on these roads since we've packed up our equipment in 1987 at the

1 very latest? It was the towns; it's the towns who 2 continue to maintain these roads. 3 JUDGE GRAFFEO: I - - - I understand you're 4 arguing that it's not a continuing tort here, but 5 would the statute of limitation in a hypothetical situation run from the date of completion or the date 6 7 of injury? 8 MR. GREISMAN: The date that the invasion 9 of the legal right took place was essentially 10 substantial completion of the work. 11 JUDGE SMITH: Isn't that - - - why - - - I 12 thought that was the contract rule? 13 MR. GREISMAN: It's also the rule in tort. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: In tort; it's the not 14 15 the date of injured? 16 MR. GREISMAN: When the question arises, 17 when can the plaintiff bring the case? 18 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, design defect cases, 19 it - - - would argue against that and there's a lot 20 of tort cases that - - - that don't have that type of 21 a statute of limitations. Black & Decker can't say I 22 made this saw in 1952. The fact that you lost your 2.3 hand in 2001, because I didn't design a guard, you 2.4 know, doesn't mean that you can't sue them.

MR. GREISMAN: The application of the rule

is different in that type of a case - - -1 2 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, I know, but you're 3 saying in tort, there's a - - -MR. GREISMAN: And in - - - and personal 4 5 injury. JUDGE PIGOTT: There's different - - -6 7 there's different statutes of limitations depending. 8 And in this one it strikes me - - - if I remember 9 right - - - this was the heyday of sewers. This is 10 when the government - - - the federal government was 11 paying like ninety-seven-and-a-half - - - or eighty-12 seven-and-a-half percent, and it was a big deal to 13 get these sewers in, and - - - and there was a lot of 14 it going on. 15 And the towns, of course, would love to 16 have them. But they're not the ones that are 17 18

And the towns, of course, would love to have them. But they're not the ones that are contracting to do them. They're the ones that say, okay, you can come down my roads; you can - - - you can tear up my sidewalks and - - - as long as you promise to put them back. But they don't know that underneath there may be these defects until the sidewalk collapses or, as your opponent is arguing, you can't plow your streets anymore.

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And they're left without a remedy as a result? I mean, wouldn't it be better to say the

1 statute runs from the time of the - - - of the 2 injury? 3 MR. GREISMAN: Well, the settled law as my 4 colleague, Mr. Denby, pointed out, is when the 5 liability that's alleged arises out of a contract, 6 you have six years, and the statute or the cause of 7 action accrues at substantial completion. 8 JUDGE PIGOTT: But if you assume my 9 hypothetical - - - not again, of course, your 10 contractors - - - but contractors who do underbid on 11 the select fill at the end, so that they can get the 12 - - - win the contract and then - - - and then don't 13 do the appropriate backfill. You know, is it - - -14 is it fair or is it your argument that if they escape 15 for six months - - - six years, they're done? 16 MR. GREISMAN: The statutes of limitations 17 are enacted by the legislature to draw lines, so - -18 19 JUDGE PIGOTT: So your answer is yes. MR. GREISMAN: The answer is yes. 20 21 JUDGE RIVERA: Does it matter if it's a 22 public nuisance? Does it matter if it constitutes a 2.3 public nuisance? 2.4 MR. GREISMAN: Well, part of the basis for 25 the dismissal of these claims is failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted from the sewer contractors. The sewer contractors, as pled in the complaint, packed up their equipment no later than 1987.

There's no allegation of an ongoing duty of any type. There's no ongoing duty to maintain, correct, or anything. Any ongoing duty to maintain is pled essentially as being the towns' and villages' job, because they're the ones who have done any construction or repairs since.

There's no ongoing deliberate conduct that can be - - - that has been alleged on the sewer contractors that would create an ongoing tort.

The - - -

JUDGE GRAFFEO: In the Cubito case, in the Second Department decision, they used the date of injury, because they found that the injured party was a stranger to the contractual arrangement.

MR. GREISMAN: When you have a - - -

JUDGE GRAFFEO: Is that - - - is there any analogy to the facts of this case? I guess that's why I asked if the record shows any involvement of the town in this contract.

MR. GREISMAN: Personal injury is really the distinguishing factor when you're talking about a

stranger to the contract. And if you have somebody who's claiming property damage or defective construction, but they're not a stranger to the contract like our towns and villages, because even if the beneficiary clauses weren't stipulated to by the towns and villages, they'd be beneficiaries to the contract, because they benefited from the sewers.

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JUDGE SMITH: If we - - - suppose we disagree with you, and we think it's not that the time runs from the date of injury, not from the date of substantial completion. What's the date of injury?

MR. GREISMAN: Substantial completion. The work that is the essence of the defective construction allegation.

JUDGE SMITH: So you're - - - even - - you're saying that even if they - - - if they injured
- - - or you injured their property - - - your
clients injured their clients' property at a
particular point, the statute doesn't start to run
until the work is completed?

Let me rephrase my question. You - - - I

see - - - you argue that the statute runs from

substantial completion. Do you argue in the

alternative that even if it runs from date of injury,

it's still time barred? 1 2 MR. GREISMAN: The date of injury here - -3 - yes, absolutely. The date of injury here - - - the 4 date of the invasion of the legal right that forms 5 the essence of plaintiff's complaint, shoddy backfill 6 - - - may I continue, please? 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes, please answer. 8 MR. GREISMAN: - - - is defective 9 construction. 10 JUDGE SMITH: You say - - - you say the 11 date of injury is the date of substantial completion. 12 MR. GREISMAN: It's when this backfill was 13 allegedly done. JUDGE GRAFFEO: Why not the - - - why not 14 15 the date that the - - - a sidewalk collapses? 16 MR. GREISMAN: The legislature has set 17 forth accrual rules for discovery for instances such 18 as 214(a), 214(c), where there have been movements 19 and efforts, and the legislature wanted to change 20 accrual rules. Some say the accrual - - -21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but you're 22 saying it's not an ongoing tort. Isn't that the basic - - - basis - - -2.3 2.4 MR. GREISMAN: It's absolutely not an 25 ongoing tort.

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That's the basis of 2 why the statute of limitations has run regardless of 3 whether it's the date of injury or not. 4 MR. GREISMAN: That's right. 5 JUDGE SMITH: But can't the - - - can't the 6 - - - can't the starting date - - - I'm just coming 7 back to the same - - - can't the starting date be the day that they failed to - - - that they failed to 8 9 shore up the land? 10 MR. GREISMAN: The date that the alleged 11 wrong took place was when - - - was sometime prior to 12 1987, when we were there doing the backfilling work. 13 JUDGE SMITH: I - - - I understand that. It doesn't - - - I'm just suggesting it's - - - I 14 15 don't know why - - - I wouldn't see why you'd resist 16 it - - - if it's not the date of substantial 17 completion, then it's the date that they committed 18 the wrong. MR. GREISMAN: The date of commission of 19 20 the wrong was be - - - at substantial completion or 21 earlier. 22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, thanks, 2.3 counsel. 2.4 MR. GREISMAN: Thank you. 25 MR. INGHAM: The line of cases that I'm

talking about, you have a hold harmless, no fault cause of action, occur only in the excavation of the trench and the backfilling of the trench. Injury and fact, when the contractors back flow - - - back hoe - - - hits - - - hits the sidewalk. The line of cases cited by Lindenhurst and by the Islip cases drag in the causes of action and defective construction that go from Sears, Sosnow, Lundin, Ossining, and Newburgh. They are totally different causes of action in contract. The hold harmless clauses - - -

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JUDGE SMITH: But even - - - even - - - but even if you're right about that, don't you have a problem, because the ordinary tort claim runs from the - - - forget about - - - plus there's no contract in the picture - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but it's - - - but your whole thing is based on whether it's

1 continuing, right? 2 MR. INGHAM: Continuing in that there is a 3 continuous interference with this easement. 4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I understand - - -5 MR. INGHAM: That's my argument. 6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But that's the part 7 of your argument that we - - - the continuing tort. 8 MR. INGHAM: If we can't apply - - - if we 9 can't get Bloomingdales and Cranesville Block in 10 here, and if we abandon Haverstraw, and you can't 11 have to support these roads to bring them back to 12 their usual condition, I don't have a continuing 13 public nuisance cause of action. I've got a problem. 14 But I urge upon you to look at the Second 15 Department decision which specifically held that I 16 had a cause of action here, and I believe I do, under 17 both Cranesville Block, under the common law of 18 Haverstraw. 19 JUDGE RIVERA: But your whole argument is based - - - it's not really a - - - it's a continuing 20 21 consequence of the wrong, which happened years ago. 22 It's a continuing interference MR. INGHAM: 2.3 with the nuisance with the easement today. There is 2.4 a continuing interference with the - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But there's no volitional

1	act by them; it's that you claim they they did
2	very bad construction years ago
3	MR. INGHAM: I agree. They did.
4	JUDGE RIVERA: and that has now had
5	consequences into today.
6	MR. INGHAM: And that's exactly what
7	happened in Cranesville Block.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.
9	MR. INGHAM: Thank you.
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you. Thank
11	you. Appreciate it. Thank you all.
12	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION

I, Karen Schiffmiller, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Town of Oyster Bay v. Lizza Industries, Inc., Nos. 214 to 223 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Hour Schoffmille.

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